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Abstract
In this paper, we study logics of dependence on the propositional level. We prove
that several interesting propositional logics of dependence, including propositional de-
pendence logic, propositional intuitionistic dependence logic as well as propositional
inquisitive logic, are expressively complete and have disjunctive or conjunctive normal
forms. We provide deduction systems and prove the completeness theorems for these
logics.
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1. Introduction
The idea of dependence logic, introduced in [30] on the basis of Hodges [18], is
the following: If truth in the traditional sense, i.e. as Tarski defined it, is defined
with respect to a set of assignments, rather than just one assignment, it becomes possi-
ble to talk meaningfully about variables being dependent or independent from each
other. The set of assignments can be thought of as a data set, giving evidence—
much as in statistics—about mutual dependencies between the variables. If the set of
assignments—the data—is thought of as a database we arrive at the concept of func-
tional dependency, an important concept in database theory since Codd’s pioneering
paper [8]. We can also consider the set of assignments as expressing uncertainty about
one “true” assignment, as in inquisitive logic ([7]), or as indicating belief about an
unknown assignment, as in doxastic logic ([13]). Finally, considering truth as given by
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sets of assignments leads naturally to the concept of the probability that a randomly
chosen assignment (from the given set) satisfies a given propositional formula. This
idea is developed in [19] to analyse so-called Bell’s Inequalities of Quantum Physics.
Following [30], we call sets of assignments teams. Teams have been previously
used to study dependence concepts in predicate logic [30] and modal logic [31]. We
now focus this study to propositional logic. The fundamental concept of dependence
logic is the concept =(~x,y) of a variable y depending on a sequence ~x of other vari-
ables, which is taken as a new atomic formula. The meaning of such atomic depen-
dence formulas is given via teams.
Studying the logics of dependence concepts in propositional logic resembles the
case of predicate logic in that we use the method of teams. A team in this case is
defined to be a set of valuations of propositional variables. There are, however, also
significant differences between the predicate logic and the propositional cases. No-
tably, propositional logics of dependence are decidable. This is because for any given
formula of the logics with n propositional variables, there are in total 2n valuations and
22n teams. The method of truth tables has its analogue in these logics, but the size of
such tables grows exponentially faster than in the case of classical propositional logic,
rendering it virtually inapplicable. This emphasizes the role of the axioms and the
completeness theorem in providing a manageable alternative for establishing logical
consequence.
Classical propositional logic is based on propositions of the form
p
Not p
p or q
If p, then q
and more generally
If pi1 , . . . ,pik , then q. (1)
We present extensions of classical propositional logic in which one can express, in
addition to the above, propositions of the form “q depends on p”, or more generally
q depends on pi1 , . . . ,pik . (2)
In our setting, (2) is treated as an atomic fact. This is expressed formally by a new
atomic formula
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,q), (3)
which we call the dependence atom.
Intuitively, (2) means that to know whether q holds it is sufficient to consult the
truth values of pi1 , . . . ,pik . Note that, as in the first-order dependence logic case, (2)
says nothing about the way in which pi1 , . . . ,pik are logically related to q. It may be
that pi1 ∧ . . .∧ pik logical implies q, or that ¬pi1 ∧ . . .∧¬pik logical implies ¬q, or
anything in between. Technically speaking, this is to say:
The truth value of q is a function of the truth values of pi1 , . . . ,pik . (4)
Some examples of natural language sentences involving dependence are the fol-
lowing:
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p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 . . .
s1 1 1 1 0 1
s2 1 0 1 0 0
s3 1 1 1 1 1 . . .
s4 1 0 1 1 0
s5 1 0 0 1 1
Table 1: A team X = {s1,s2,s3,s4,s5}
1. Whether it rains depends completely on whether it is winter or summer.
2. Whether you end up in the town depends entirely on whether you turn left here
or right.
3. I will be absent depending on whether he shows up or not.
We now define propositional dependence logic formally. We start by recalling clas-
sical propositional logic and define our team semantics for it. Although team semantics
is intended for the extension of classical propositional logic obtained by adding the new
atomic formulas, namely the dependence atoms of (3), it has some interesting uses in
the classical case, too, as we will see below.
Definition 1.1. Let {pi | i ∈ N} be the set of propositional variables. Well-formed
formulas of classical propostional logic (CPL) are given by the following grammar
φ ::= pi | ¬pi | ⊥ | (φ∧φ) | (φ⊗φ) | (φ→ φ).
We use the symbol ⊗ to denote the disjunction of CPL and reserve the usual dis-
junction symbol ∨ for another use. Hereafter we adopt the usual convention for nega-
tion and write ¬φ for the formula φ→ ⊥. We will see from the definition of team
semantics below that the negated propositional variable ¬pi has the same semantics as
pi→⊥.
We now give the formal definition of the crucial notion of the team semantics,
namely teams.
Definition 1.2. A valuation is a function from the set N of natural numbers to the set
2 = {0,1}. A team X is a set of valuations. That is, X ⊆ 2N.
See Table 1 for an example of a team. One can think of a team such as that given
in Table 1 as the result of five tests about the atomic propositions p1,p2, .... The atomic
propositions may code basic data about people and the five assignments s1, ...,s5 may
be this data for five different people. The atomic propositions p1,p2, ... may also record
moves in a game. The five rows represent then five plays of the same game. There are
many possible intuitions about teams and we do not fix any particular intuition. The
empty set /0 and the full set 2N are special cases of teams. Another rather special case
is the singleton team {s}. The usual semantics of propositional logic resembles team
semantics with singleton teams. It is the non-singleton teams that bring out the new
phenomena of team semantics.
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Definition 1.3. We inductively define the notion of a formula φ in the language of CPL
being true on a team X , denoted X |= φ, as follows:
• X |= pi iff for all s ∈X , s(i) = 1
• X |= ¬pi iff for all s ∈X , s(i) = 0
• X |=⊥ iff X = /0
• X |= φ∧ψ iff X |= φ and X |= ψ
• X |= φ⊗ψ iff there exist two subteams Y,Z ⊆ X with X = Y ∪Z such that
Y |= φ and Z |= ψ
• X |= φ→ ψ iff for any subteam Y ⊆X , Y |= φ =⇒ Y |= ψ
In this paper, we also call formulas in the language of CPL classical formulas. An
easy inductive proof shows that classical formulas φ are flat, that is,
(Flatness Property) X |= φ ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈X({s} |= φ) holds for all teams X .
This means that the truth of a classical formula under the team semantics is determined
by its truth over singleton teams. Over singleton teams the disjunction ⊗ and the im-
plication → behave classically:
{s} |= φ⊗ψ ⇐⇒ {s} |= φ or {s} |= ψ
{s} |= φ→ ψ ⇐⇒ {s} 6|= φ or {s} |= ψ.
From this one can easily show that for classical formulas the team semantics over
singleton teams coincides with the usual truth semantics of CPL, that is,
{s} |= φ ⇐⇒ s |= φ holds for all classical formulas φ (5)
where s |= φ is meant in the ordinary sense of a valuation s satisfying φ. In this sense,
the team semantics for classical formulas actually reduces to the usual single-valuation
semantics.
Let |φ|X = {s ∈X : {s} |= φ}. For any classical formula φ and any team X
X |= φ implies |φ|X =X
X |= ¬φ implies |φ|X = /0
but the set |φ|X can also be a proper non-empty subset of X , e.g., the set |p2|X =
{s1,s3} of the team X of Table 1. In [19] the number | |φ|X |/|X | (for finite non-empty
X) is for obvious reasons called the probability of φ in X , denoted [φ]X . When such
probabilities are considered it makes sense to allow the same valuation to occur in X
many times (i.e., to consider multisets). In [19] a complete axiomatization is given for
propositions about linear combinations of probabilities [φ]X . However, in this paper
we proceed in a different direction and use teams to define truth values for dependence
statements. We now define the logic for expressing dependence statements.
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Definition 1.4. Well-formed formulas of propositional downward closed team logic
(PT0) are given by the following grammar
φ ::= pi | ¬pi | ⊥ |=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) | (φ∧φ) | (φ⊗φ) | (φ∨φ) | (φ→ φ)
We call the connectives⊗, ∨ and → tensor (disjunction), intuitionistic disjunction
and intuitionistic implication, respectively.
Definition 1.5. We inductively define the notion of a formula φ in the language of PT0
being true on a team X , denoted X |= φ. All the cases are identical to those defined in
Definition 1.3 and additionally:
• X |= =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) iff for all s,s′ ∈X ,
[s(i1) = s
′(i1), . . . , s(ik) = s
′(ik) ] =⇒ s(j) = s
′(j);
• X |= φ∨ψ iff X |= φ or X |= ψ;
We say that a formula φ in the language of PT0 is valid, denoted |= φ, if X |= φ
holds for all teams X . We write φ |= ψ if X |= φ =⇒X |= ψ holds for all teams X ,
and say then that ψ is a semantic consequence of φ. If φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ, then we say
that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent, in symbols φ≡ ψ.
Immediately from the team semantics we obtain that formulas in the language of
PT0 have the properties stated in the following theorem. These properties also hold in
the case of first-order dependence logic (see e.g. [30]).
Theorem 1.6. Let φ be a formula in the language of PT0, and X and Y two teams.
(Locality Property) If {pi1 , . . . ,pin} is the set of propositional variables occurring in
φ and {s ↾ {i1, . . . , in} : s ∈X}= {s ↾ {i1, . . . , in} : s ∈ Y }, then
X |= φ ⇐⇒ Y |= φ.
(Downward Closure Property) If X |= φ and Y ⊆X , then Y |= φ.
(Empty Team Property) /0 |= φ.
Let us spend a few words on the atoms and the connectives of our logic PT0. To
get an idea of the definition of X |= =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) let us consider an example. In
Table 1 we have a team X satisfying the dependence atom =(p2,p3,p5). This means
that if we take any two rows of the team with the same truth values for both p2 and p3,
then also the truth value of p5 is the same. On rows 1 and 3 we have p2 and p3 true, and
indeed on both rows p5 has the same truth value, namely true. Similarly, on rows 2 and
4 we have on both rows p2 false and p3 true, and indeed on both rows p5 has the same
truth value, namely false. This is often (especially in database theory) called functional
dependency, because there is a function which gives the value of p5 with the values of
p2 and p3 as arguments. In this case the function is
(1,1) 7→ 1, (0,1) 7→ 0, (0,0) 7→ 1.
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Functional dependencies are axiomatized in database theory by the so-called Arm-
strong’s Axioms [2] as follows3 (presented in terms of dependence atoms):
(i) =(x,x)
(ii) if =(x,y,z), then =(y,x,z)
(iii) if =(x,x,y), then =(x,y)
(iv) if =(y,z), then =(x,y,z)
(v) if =(x,y) and =(y,z), then =(x,z)
But these rules do not characterize the interaction between dependence atoms and other
formulas. We will define in Section 4.3 natural deduction rules for dependence atoms
that also characterize such interactions, and give a simple derivation of Armstrong’s
Axioms from those rules.
One distinguishing feature of dependence atoms is that they are in general not flat.
To see why, consider an arbitrary dependence atom =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) and an arbitrary
valuation s. By the semantics we know that {s} |= =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) is always true
(for {s} is a singleton). However, obviously not every dependence atom is true on
every team. For example, the team X from Table 1 falsifies =(p3,p4,p5), as, e.g.,
s1(p3) = 1 = s2(p3) and s1(p4) = 0 = s2(p4), whereas s1(p5) = 1 6= 0 = s2(p5).
The negation of an arbitrary formula φ in the language of PT0 is defined as ¬φ :=
φ→⊥. Such defined negations ¬φ are always flat. Since dependence atoms are true
on singleton teams, the negation of a dependence atom (a flat formula) is true only on
the empty team, i.e., X |= ¬=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) iff X = /0, or ¬=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)≡ ⊥.
For other interesting properties of the negation of team semantics we refer the reader
to [20].
The semantics of tensor⊗ resembles the semantics of tensor in linear logic; see [1]
for further discussion. To understand the semantics of φ⊗ψ, we may think of a team X
as representing uncertainty about an unknown valuation s, then the representationX =
Y ∪Z narrows the uncertainty into two more certain cases Y and Z that respectively
satisfy each of the disjuncts. Since the tensor ⊗ of PT0 originates from the disjunction
of CPL, it is not surprising (and we leave it for the reader to check) that the Law of
Excluded Middle with respect to ⊗ holds for classical formulas α, i.e., |= α⊗¬α, and,
in fact, it holds also for all flat formulas. For non-flat formulas the Law fails in general;
e.g., 6|==(pi)⊗¬=(pi).
The set P(2N) \ { /0} of all nonempty teams endowed with the superset relation ⊇
forms an intuitionistic Kripke frame F= (P(2N)\{ /0},⊇). The team semantics for the
intuitionistic disjunction ∨ and the intuitionistic implication → resembles the Kripke
semantics of the disjunction and the implication of intuitionistic propositional logic
over the fixed Kripke frame F. We will come back to this issue in Section 4.1. For now
we want to point out that the intuitionistic disjunction of PT0 does have a constructive
feature, as it satisfies the Disjunction Property:
3In this paper we only consider a simplified version of Armstrong’s Axioms. In full generality Arm-
strong’s Axioms have arbitrary finite sequences of variables.
6
pi1 pi2 · · · pin X1 X2 · · · X22n
s1 1 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1
s2 0 1 · · · 1 0 1 · · · 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
s2n 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 1
φ 1 0 · · · 1
Table 2: A truth table for a formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)
(Disjunction Property) If |= φ∨ψ, then |= φ or |= ψ.
To see why this holds, let 2N be the biggest team. By the downward closure property
we have
|= φ∨ψ =⇒ 2N |= φ∨ψ =⇒ 2N |= φ or 2N |= ψ =⇒ |= φ or |= ψ.
For the intuitionistic implication of PT0 the Deduction Theorem holds:
(Deduction Theorem) Γ,φ |= ψ if and only if Γ |= φ→ ψ.
Over singleton teams these two intuitionistic connectives behave in the classical man-
ner. We already discussed this for the intuitionistic implication (which has the same
team semantics as the implication of CPL); for the intuitionistic disjunction we have
{s} |= φ∨ψ ⇐⇒ {s} |= φ or {s} |= ψ.
In classical propositional logic CPL a fundamental and intuitive method to study
the meaning of propositional formulas is the truth table method. The truth table me-
thodically lists all the possible valuations and a simple computation yields 1 or 0 as
the truth value of the formula for that valuation. Once the table is drawn, a column
of 1’s for φ means the formula φ is valid and a column with at least one 1 means φ is
satisfiable. For a formula of n propositional variables the table has 2n rows, whence
this method is said to be of exponential (time) complexity, but conceived as a guessing
problem the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. Respectively, the validity problem
is co-NP-complete. When we move to propositional downward closed team logic PT0,
the situation is one step more complicated. We still have the truth table method but
now the truth table has two parts. In Table 2 we have on the left a table of all possible
valuations and the last columns “X” make a choice which valuations are taken to the
team X . Finally, if a formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin ) is given, a systematic list of its truth val-
ues in different teams can be listed at the bottom of the table. All this is in principle
doable, but of course the size of the table quickly explodes.
Let N be an n-element set of natural numbers. We call a function s : N → {0,1}
a valuation on N , and a set of valuations on N a team on N . For example, the teams
Xi in Table 2 are teams on {i1, . . . , in}. There are in total 2n distinct valuations
on N , and 22n distinct teams on N , among which there is a biggest team (denoted
2N ) consisting of all valuations on N . For any formula φ in the language of PT0 we
write φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) to mean that the propositional variables occurring in φ are among
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pi1 , . . . ,pin . By the locality property, to evaluate a formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) it is suffi-
cient to consider teams on N = {i1, . . . , in} only. We write JφK for the set of all teams
on N satisfying φ, i.e.,
JφK := {X ⊆ 2N |X |= φ}.
It follows from Theorem 1.6 that the set JφK is nonempty (since /0 ∈ JφK) and closed
under subsets. Denote by ∇N the family of all nonempty downward closed collections
of teams on N , i.e.,
∇N = {K ⊆ 22
N
| K 6= /0 and (Y ⊆X ∈ K =⇒ Y ∈ K)}.
We will prove in this paper that the logic PT0 is expressively complete in the sense that
given any set N = {i1, . . . , in} of natural numbers,
∇N = {JφK : φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) is a formula in the language of PT0}. (6)
We study in this paper also some fragments of PT0 whose well-formed formulas
are defined in some sublanguages. The following table defines the set of atoms and
connectives of the languages of these logics. We call these logics propositional logics
of dependence.
Logic Atoms Connectives
Propositional dependence logic (PD) pi,¬pi,⊥,=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) ∧,⊗
Propositional dependence logic with
intuitionistic disjunction (PD∨) pi,¬pi,⊥ ∧,⊗,∨
Propositional intuitionistic dependence
logic (PID) pi,⊥,=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) ∧,∨,→
Propositional inquisitive logic (InqL) pi,⊥ ∧,∨,→
We consider the above-defined propositional logics of dependence of particular in-
terest for the following reasons. Firstly, PD and PID are the propositional logics of
their first-order counterparts known in the literature of logics of dependence (see e.g,
[30, 33]). InqL is a logic for a new formal semantics, inquisitive semantics ([7]).
Although the motivation of InqL is very different from ours, the logic InqL adopts
essentially the same team semantics. For this reason we regard InqL as a type of logic
of dependence in this paper. We will discuss the connection between InqL and PID
in Section 2. Secondly, we will prove in Section 3 that all of the above logics being
syntactically proper fragments of PT0 are actually expressively complete as well. We
say that two propositional logics of dependence L1 and L2 have the same expressive
power, written L1 ≡ L2, if every formula in the language of L1 is semantically equiv-
alent to a formula in the language of L2, and vice versa. As a consequence of their
expressive completeness, all of the logics mentioned above have the same expressive
power. Thirdly, we will show in Section 3 that formulas in the language of these logics
have natural disjunctive or conjunctive normal forms that resemble the normal forms
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of classical propositional logic. On the basis of the normal forms in Section 4 we ax-
iomatize the logics PD, PD∨ and PID. The logic InqL was already axiomatized in [7]
using an argument that makes essential use of the same normal form. Let us end this
section by stating the main results just mentioned as two theorems below.
Theorem 1.7. All of the logics PT0, PD, PD∨, InqL and PID are expressively com-
plete. In particular, PT0 ≡ PD≡ PD∨ ≡ InqL≡ PID.
Theorem 1.8. The deduction systems of PD, PD∨ and PID defined in Section 4 are
sound and (strongly) complete.
2. Dependence atoms and inquisitive semantics
In this section, we make some comments on dependence atoms and discuss the
connection between inquisitive semantics and logics of dependence.
In general, a (first-order or propositional) dependence atom =(x1, . . . ,xk,y) states
the existence of a function f mapping each possible assignment s for xi1 , . . . ,xik to
an assignment for y. In the first-order context, the value s(xim) ranges over the (pos-
sibly infinite) domain of a first-order model. In the propositional context, s(xim) has
only two possible values, namely 0 or 1, and the f is a Boolean function that has the
finite range {0,1}. In the presence of the intuitionistic disjunction the behavior of the
Boolean function (thus the dependence atom) can be easily expressed. This also ex-
plains why we name the logic PD∨ propositional dependence logic with intuitionistic
disjunction even though it does not have dependence atoms in its language. In the
following lemma we present two equivalent definitions of propositional dependence
atoms that are known in the literature (see e.g. [17, 24, 31, 34]). The proof of their
equivalence is left to the reader. Note that the same definitions do not apply to first-
order dependence atoms (c.f. [22]).
Lemma 2.1. Let K = {i1, . . . , ik}. We have
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)≡
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧ (pj ∨¬pj)
)
≡
∨
f∈22K
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧p
f(s)
j
)
where p1i := pi and p0i := ¬pi for any index i. In particular, =(pj)≡ pj ∨¬pj .
It follows from the above lemma that dependence atoms =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) with
multiple arguments can be defined using dependence atoms =(pi) with single argu-
ment. We call such atoms =(pi) constancy dependence atoms. The team semantics
given in Definition 1.5 for these atoms is reduced to
• X |= =(pi) iff for all s,s′ ∈X , s(i) = s′(i)
meaning that pi has a constant value in the team in question (which can be charac-
terized by the formula pi ∨¬pi as in the preceding lemma). An alternative definition
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of dependence atom with multiple arguments using constancy dependence atoms and
intuitionistic implication was given in [1]. We present this definition without the proof
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)≡
(
=(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pik )
)
→=(pj).
It follows immediately from the above lemma that propositional intuitionistic de-
pendence logic PID has the same expressive power as propositional inquisitive logic
InqL. That InqL independently adopts essentially the same team semantics as propo-
sitional logics of dependence was observed by Dick de Jongh and Tadeusz Litak4. It is
worthwhile to emphasize that InqL was introduced with a different motivation along
the research line of inquisitive semantics ([7, 16]), a new formal semantics character-
izing both assertions (e.g., It is raining.) and questions (e.g., Is it raining?) in natural
language. In InqL a team represents uncertainty about an assignment. Let us look
at an example, the team of Table 1. The five assignments can be thought to represent
uncertainty about one “right” assignment. In this case there is no uncertainty about
p1 because it has value 1 on every row, but there is some uncertainty about each of
p2, . . . ,p5. Subteams represent in this interpretation increased certainty and a single-
ton team represents absolute certainty. The meaning of the implication φ→ ψ is here
“Whichever way our knowledge improves so that it supports φ, then also ψ is sup-
ported”. The meaning of the dependence atom =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) along the same lines
is “If uncertainty about pi1 , . . . ,pik vanishes, then also pj becomes certain”. The in-
tuition of a team as a state of uncertainty is a useful guiding principle for example in
choosing logical operations, and has led to the formulation of InqL as it is. The intu-
ition in propositional dependence logic is more general covering not only the idea of
uncertainty but also the idea of the elements of a team being results of tests or observa-
tions without any intention of there being the “right” assignment. We refer the reader
to [7, 16] for details on inquisitive semantics.
Strings of the form =(φ1, . . . ,φk,ψ), where the arguments φ1, . . . ,φk,ψ are arbi-
trary formulas, are not necessarily well-formed formulas of the logics we study. We
decide to apply this restricted syntax for dependence atoms, because we do not have
a good intuition for the intended meaning of nested dependence atoms, e.g., strings of
the form =(=(p1,p2),=(p3,p4)). A recent work [6] by Ciardelli interprets in the in-
quisitive semantics setting the dependence atoms as question entailment, and suggests
to define
X |==(φ1, . . . ,φk,ψ) ⇐⇒ df X |=
(
(φ1∨¬φ1)∧·· ·∧ (φk ∨¬φk)
)
→ (ψ∨¬ψ)
(which generalizes the equivalences in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2). We do not have a strong
argument in favor or against this definition from the perspective of dependence logic,
and we are open to other possible alternative definitions for dependence atoms with
arbitrary arguments. If we restrict the arguments φ1, . . . ,φk,ψ to classical formulas,
then the above definition is equivalent to
X |==(φ1, . . . ,φk,ψ) ⇐⇒ df X |=
⊗
s∈2K
(
φ
s(1)
1 ∧·· ·∧φ
s(k)
k ∧ (ψ∨¬ψ)
)
4In a private conversation with the first author in September 2011.
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where K = {1, . . . ,k}. Dependence atoms with classical arguments are studied in the
literature; see e.g., [9, 17, 20].
3. Expressive power and normal forms
In this section, we study the expressive power and the normal forms of the propo-
sitional logics of dependence we defined in Section 1.
The usual classical propositional logic CPL is expressively complete in the sense
that every set X ⊆ 2N of valuations on N = {i1, . . . , in} is definable by some formula
φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) in the language of CPL, i.e., X = {s ∈ 2N : s |= φ}. It is well-known
that the sets {∧,¬}, {⊗,¬}, {→,¬} of connectives of CPL are functionally complete.
Therefore the fragments of CPL whose well-formed formulas are defined with these
sets of connectives and the atoms pi are also expressively complete. Analogously, we
will show that propositional downward closed team logic PT0 and its proper fragments
PD, PD∨, PID and InqL are expressively complete in the sense of Equation (6) in
Section 1, that is, every nonempty downward closed collection K of teams on N is
definable by a formula φ in the language of the logics (i.e., K = {X ⊆ 2N : X |= φ}).
This will prove Theorem 1.7. The results in Theorem 1.7 that concern InqL and PID
can be found essentially in [5, 7]; we record them here for the completeness of the
paper. The result in Theorem 1.7 that concerns PD is due to Taneli Huuskonen who
kindly permitted us to include his argument in this paper.
It follows immediately from the expressive completeness result that all of the logics
we consider have the same expressive power. We have pointed out in the previous
section that the expressive equivalence between the two differently motivated logics,
PID and InqL, is striking, though mathematically this equivalence actually already
follows from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. That PD and PID are expressively equivalent is
also surprising, because their first-order counterparts are very much different from each
other in expressive power. First-order dependence logic has the same expressive power
as existential second-order logic [21, 30], while first-order intuitionistic dependence
logic is expressively equivalent to full second-order logic [33].
It will follow from our proof of Theorem 1.7 that every formula in the language of
InqL and PID is equivalent to a formula in disjunctive-negative normal form (which
was obtained already in [5, 7]), every formula in the language of PD∨ is equivalent
to a formula in disjunctive normal form, and every formula in the language of PD
is equivalent to a formula in conjunctive normal form. By Theorem 1.7, all these
disjunctive and conjunctive normal forms apply to formulas in the language of PT0 as
well. We therefore will not discuss the normal form for PT0 separately. We will argue
in the sequel that these normal forms of propositional logics of dependence resemble
the same normal forms in classical propositional logic CPL, because they characterize
the truth table of a formula in a similar way.
We will treat the logics PD∨, InqL and PID first, and then the logic PD. Let us
start by defining for each team X a formula ΘX in the language of PD∨ and a formula
ΨX in the language of InqL and PID that define the family of subteams of the team X .
We work with all these three logics at the same time and all results concerning InqL
and PID can be found essentially in [7] and [5].
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Lemma 3.1 ([7]). Let X be a team on N = {i1, . . . , in}. Define
• ΘX :=
⊗
s∈X
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
)
• ΨX := ¬¬
∨
s∈X
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
)
where we stipulate Θ /0 =⊥= Ψ /0. For any team Y on N , we have
Y |= ΘX ⇐⇒ Y ⊆X ⇐⇒ Y |= ΨX .
Proof. We first prove that ΘX ≡ ΨX for all teams X on N . Since ΘX is a classical
formula and ΨX is a negated formula (viewing⊥ as ¬(⊥→⊥)), the two formulas are
both flat. Thus it suffices to show that {s} |= ΘX ⇐⇒ {s} |= ΨX for all valuations s.
But this is clear.
It then suffices to check that Y |= ΘX ⇐⇒ Y ⊆X . For “=⇒”, suppose Y |= ΘX .
If X = /0, then ΘX = ⊥, and Y = /0 =X . Now assume that X 6= /0. For each s ∈X ,
there exists a set Ys such that
Y =
⋃
s∈X
Ys and Ys |= ps(i1)i1 ∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
.
Thus either Ys = /0 or Ys = {s} implying Y ⊆X .
Conversely, for “⇐=”, by the downward closure property it suffices to show that
X |= ΘX . If X = /0, then ΘX = ⊥ and /0 |= ⊥. Now, assume that X 6= /0. For each
s ∈X , we have {s} |= ps(i1)i1 ∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
, which implies that X |= ΘX .
We are now ready to give the proof of the claims in Theorem 1.7 concerning the
logics PT0, PD∨, InqL and PID. The proof for PD will be given later.
Proof of Theorem 1.7 (part 1). We will prove that all of the logics PT0, PD∨, InqL
and PID are expressively complete. It suffices to show that for every finite set N =
{i1, . . . , in} of natural numbers, every nonempty downward closed class K ∈ ∇N =
{K ⊆ 22N | K 6= /0 and (X ∈ K, Y ⊆X =⇒ Y ∈ K)} of teams on N is definable by a
formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) of the logic, i.e., K = JφK.
If K = { /0}, then clearly K = J⊥K = JΘ /0K = JΨ /0K. Now, assume that K ⊃ { /0}.
Since K is a finite set (of at most 22n elements), the string ∨X∈K ΘX is a formula in
the language of PD∨ and PT0, and
∨
X∈K ΨX is a formula in the language of InqL,
PID and PT0. By Lemma 3.1 for any team Y on N we have
Y |=
∨
X∈K
ΦX ⇐⇒ ∃X ∈ K(Y ⊆X) ⇐⇒ Y ∈ K,
where ΦX ∈ {ΘX ,ΨX}. Thus J
∨
X∈K ΦXK =K.
It follows from the proof of the above theorem that every formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)
in the language of PT0 is semantically equivalent to a formula in the language of PD∨
in disjunctive normal form:
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
) (7)
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p1 p2 X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · X16
s1 1 1 0 0 0 0 · · · 1
s2 0 1 0 1 1 1 · · · 1
s3 1 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 1
s4 0 0 0 0 0 1 · · · 1
φ 1 1 0 1 · · · 0
Table 3: A truth table for a formula φ(p1,p2)
and also to a formula in the language of InqL or PID in disjunctive-negative normal
form: ∨
f∈F
¬¬
∨
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
), (8)
where F is a nonempty finite set of indices and each Xf is a team on {i1, . . . , in}.
It is worthwhile to point out that a similar normal form (of typically infinite size) for
first-order dependence logic extended with intuitionistic disjunction was suggested al-
ready in [1]. As with classical propositional logic, the normal form of a formula in the
language of PT0 or PD∨ or InqL or PID can be computed from its truth table. As an
illustration, consider the truth table presented in Table 3 for a formula φ(p1,p2). We
first read off from the table the set X = {Xf : f ∈ F} = {X : X |= φ} of teams that
satisfy the formula φ. Then for each f ∈ F , we read off the valuations belonging to the
team Xf from its corresponding column in the table. Each such column can be viewed
as a column in the standard truth table of classical propositional logic, which can be
characterized (in the standard way) by a classical formula ΘXf in disjunctive normal
form. We have, in the end, that φ is semantically equivalent to a formula
∨
f∈F ΘXf
in the language of PD∨ in disjunctive normal form. The set X in Table 3 has elements
X1,X2,X4, etc., and e.g. ΘX4 = (¬p1∧p2)⊗ (¬p1∧¬p2). In the same manner from
the truth table one can also compute the formula
∨
f∈F ΨXf in the language of InqL
or PID in disjunctive-negative normal form.
Formulas in disjunctive(-negative) normal form are well-behaved in the sense of
the next lemma. In Section 4 we will apply this lemma to prove the Completeness
Theorem for the deduction system of PD∨.
Lemma 3.2. Let {Xf | f ∈ F}, {Yg | g ∈ G} be nonempty finite collections of teams
on a set N of natural numbers. Let ΦXf ∈ {ΘXf ,ΨXf } for each f ∈ F and ΦYg ∈
{ΘYg ,ΨYg} for each g ∈G. The following are equivalent.
(i)
∨
f∈F
ΦXf |=
∨
g∈G
ΦYg .
(ii) For each f ∈ F , there exists gf ∈G such that Xf ⊆ Ygf .
Proof. (i)=⇒(ii): For each f0 ∈ F we have Xf0 |= ΦXf0 by Lemma 3.1. Thus Xf0 |=∨
f∈F ΦXf , which by (i) implies that Xf0 |=
∨
g∈GΦYg . This means that there exists
gf0 ∈G such that Xf0 |= ΦYgf0 . Thus by Lemma 3.1 again we obtain Xf0 ⊆ Ygf0 .
13
(ii)=⇒(i): Suppose X is any team on N satisfying X |= ∨f∈F ΦXf . Then X |=
ΦXf for some f ∈ F , which by Lemma 3.1 and (ii) means that X ⊆ Xf ⊆ Ygf for
some gf ∈G. Since Ygf |= ΦYgf holds by Lemma 3.1, it follows from the downward
closure property that X |= ΦYgf , thereby X |=
∨
g∈GΦYg , as required.
Let us now turn to the logic PD, for which the intuitionistic disjunction is not in the
language. In the context of first-order dependence logic the intuitionistic disjunction is
uniformly definable using other connectives and quantifiers (see e.g. [34]). However,
this is not the case for propositional dependence logic. The intuitionistic disjunction is
not uniformly definable by other connectives in propositional dependence logic [5, 35].
For this reason we cannot determine the expressive power or obtain the normal form
for PD directly from the results we just established for PD∨.
We will now give the proof of the claims in Theorem 1.7 concerning PD and
thereby complete the proof of the theorem. Also, a conjunctive normal form for PD
will follow from the proof. This argument is due to Taneli Huuskonen. We present his
proof here with his kind permission.
Proof of Theorem 1.7 (continued). We will show that PD is expressively complete. It
suffices to show that for every finite set N = {i1, . . . , in} of natural numbers, every
downward closed class K ∈ ∇N of teams on N , there is a formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) in
the language of PD such that K = JφK.
Define formulas αm for each natural number m as follows:
α0 :=⊥, α1 := =(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pin) and αm :=
m⊗
i=1
α1 for m≥ 2.
Claim 1. For any team X on N , we have X |= αm iff |X | ≤m.
Proof of Claim 1. Clearly, X |= α0 ⇐⇒ X = /0 ⇐⇒ |X | ≤ 0, and X |= α1 ⇐⇒
|X | ≤ 1. If m> 1, then we have
X |= αm ⇐⇒ X =
m⋃
i=1
Xi with Xi |= α1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
⇐⇒ X =
m⋃
i=1
Xi with |Xi| ≤ 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
⇐⇒ |X | ≤m.
⊣
Let Y be a nonempty team on N with |Y |= k+ 1. By Lemma 3.1 we have
X |= Θ2N\Y ⇐⇒ X ⊆ 2N \Y ⇐⇒ X ∩Y = /0. (9)
Define ΞY := αk⊗Θ2N\Y .
Claim 2. For any team X on N , we have X |= ΞY iff Y *X .
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Proof of Claim 2. First, we have
X |= ΞY ⇐⇒ X = U ∪V such that U |= αk and V |= Θ2N\Y
⇐⇒ X = U ∪V such that |U | ≤ k and V ∩Y = /0. (10)
Next, we prove the claim. Assuming Y * X , we have |Y \X | ≥ 1 and X =
(Y ∩X)∪ (X \Y ), where (X \Y )∩Y = /0. Since
|Y ∩X |= |Y |− |Y \X | ≤ (k+ 1)− 1= k,
by (10) we conclude that X |= ΞY .
Conversely, assuming X |= ΞY , by (10) we have X = U ∪ V , where |U | ≤ k <
k+1= |Y | and V ∩Y = /0. It follows that there exists s ∈ Y such that s /∈U ∪V =X ,
and therefore Y *X . ⊣
Let K ∈ ∇N . Consider the finite class 22
N
\K = {Yj | j ∈ J} of teams on N that
are not in K.
Claim 3. For any team X on N , we have X ∈K ⇐⇒ Yj *X for all j ∈ J.
Proof of Claim 3. If X /∈ K, then X = Yj0 for some j0 ∈ J by the definition. Thus
Yj0 ⊆X . Conversely, if X ∈ K, then we have Y ∈ K for all Y ⊆X since K is closed
under subsets. Hence we must have Yj *X for all j ∈ J . ⊣
Finally, since /0 ∈K, we have Yj 6= /0 for any j ∈ J . Hence by Claim 2 and Claim 3
we obtain that for any team X on N ,
X |=
∧
j∈J
ΞYj ⇐⇒ Yj *X for all j ∈ J ⇐⇒ X ∈ K,
i.e., K = J
∧
j∈J ΞYj K, as required.
We conclude from the proof above that every formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) in the lan-
guage of PD is semantically equivalent to a formula in conjunctive normal form
∧
g∈G
(
αkg ⊗Θ2N\Yg
)
,
where G is a finite set of indices and each Yg is a nonempty team on N = {i1, . . . , in}
with |Yg| = kg + 1. To compute the conjunctive normal form of a formula φ from its
truth table (see Table 3 for an example), first find the set Y = {Yg | g ∈G} of teams that
falsify the formula φ. Then we write the formula Θ∗Yg according to the column of each
Yg and the formula in normal form is
∧
g∈GΘ∗Yg . For example, the set Y in Table 3
contains X3,X16, etc., and Θ∗X3 = (=(p1)∧=(p2))⊗ (p1∧p2)⊗ (¬p1∧¬p2).
Propositional logic can be viewed as first-order logic over a first-order model 2 with
a two-element domain {0,1}. A valuation on an n-element index set N = {i1, . . . , in}
can be viewed as a first-order assignment from a set {xi1 , . . . ,xin} of first-order vari-
ables into the first-order model 2. In this sense Theorem 1.7 shows that for a fixed num-
ber n, propositional logics of dependence (viewed as a restricted first-order dependence
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logic) can characterize all nonempty downward closed classes K of first-order teams
of 2 with an n-element domain. These classes K are called (2,n)-suits by Cameron
and Hodges in [4], where the authors estimate the number of distinct collections K for
fixed n. The counting result in [4] implies that there is no compositional semantics
for the propositional logics of dependence we consider in this paper in which the se-
mantic truth set of a formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) is a subset of 2N justifying that the team
semantics given in this paper is indeed an appropriate compositional semantics for the
propositional logics of dependence.
Another simple but important corollary of Theorem 1.7 is that we can now conclude
from the compactness of InqL, established in [7], that all of the propositional logics of
dependence we consider are compact.
Theorem 3.3 (Compactness). The logics PT0, PD, PD∨, InqL and PID are compact,
that is, if Γ |= φ, then there exists a finite subset ∆ of Γ such that ∆ |= φ.
Proof. The compactness of InqL is proved in [7]. Now, by Theorem 1.7 every formula
in the language of any of the other logics is semantically equivalent to a formula in the
language of InqL. Hence the compactness of the other logics follows.
4. Axiomatizations
We have already noted in Section 1 the significant difference between first-order de-
pendence logic and propositional logics of dependence. First-order dependence logic
is not axiomatizable as it is equivalent to existential second-order logic ([30]). Some
partial axiomatization of first-order logics of dependence can be found in the literature
[12, 22]. Propositional logics of dependence are axiomatizable in full. This section is
devoted to developing complete axiomatizations for the propositional logics of depen-
dence defined in Section 1. The logic InqL was already axiomatized in [7]. Adding two
obvious axioms characterizing the equivalences in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 to the Hilbert
style deduction system of InqL given in [7] we obtain a sound and complete deduction
system of PID in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we define a natural deduction system
of PD∨ and prove the Soundness and Completeness Theorem. Our argument makes
essential use of the disjunctive normal form obtained in the previous section. The logic
PD that lacks the intuitionistic disjunction will be axiomatized in Section 4.3.
A recent paper [29] provides a Hilbert style deduction system and a labelled tableau
system for PD and PD∨. Based on the deduction system in [7] and the system for PD∨
to be given in Section 4.2 (also recorded in the dissertation [34] of the first author),
in the context of inquisitive semantics a recent paper [6] gave a sound and complete
natural deduction system of the logic PT0 without dependence atoms. Adding to this
system the obvious rules that characterize the equivalences in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, one
obtains immediately a sound and complete natural deduction system of PT0. We will,
therefore, not treat PT0 in this section.
Before we axiomatize the logics, let us first define and examine the relevant basic
notions. A (syntactic) consequence relation ⊢L of a logic L is a relation on P(FrmL)×
FrmL, where FrmL is the set of all well-formed formulas in the language of L. In what
follows we will define Hilbert-style deduction systems or natural deduction systems
16
for our propositional logics of dependence. For these logics L we write Γ ⊢L φ if
φ ∈ Γ, or there is a derivation (defined as usual) in the given deduction system with the
conclusion φ and the hypotheses from Γ. If no confusion arises we write simply Γ ⊢ φ.
If ⊢L φ, then φ is called a theorem of L. If φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ, then we say that φ and
ψ are provably equivalent, in symbols φ ⊣⊢ ψ. The main result of this section is that
the consequence relation ⊢L for every propositional logic of dependence L we consider
in this paper is sound and (strongly) complete, that is, ⊢L equals |=, where |= is the
semantic consequence relation defined in Section 1.
A consequence relation ⊢L is said to be structural if ⊢L is closed under uniform
substitution, i.e., if Γ ⊢L φ, then {σ(γ) | γ ∈ Γ} ⊢L σ(φ) holds for all substitutions σ
of L. A substitution σ of L is a function from the set of all propositional variables to
the set of all well-formed formulas of L that commutes with the connectives in L. For-
mulas of PD and PD∨ are, by definition, assumed to be in strict negation normal form,
that is, negation occurs in front of propositional variables only. This way substitution
instances ¬σ(p) of the formula ¬p are not necessarily well-formed formulas in the
language of PD or PD∨. Also, in Section 2 we mentioned that substitution instances
=(σ(pi1), . . . ,σ(pik )) of the formula =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ) may not be well-formed formulas
of the logics either. We already proposed possible ways to extend the logic so as to
make the notion of substitution well-defined in our logics. Apart from the definition
issue, note that the (sound and complete) consequence relations of these logics cannot
be structural. As an illustration, for the logics PD and PD∨ we have
pi⊗pi |= pi, whereas =(pi)⊗=(pi) 6|==(pi) and (pi∨¬pi)⊗(pi∨¬pi) 6|= (pi∨¬pi);
(11)
for the logics InqL and PID we have
|= ¬¬pi→ pi, whereas 6|= ¬¬(pi∨¬pi)→ (pi∨¬pi). (12)
In other words, the Substitution Rule
φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)
Sub
φ(ψ1/pi1 , . . . ,ψn/pin)
is not sound in these logics. For this reason in the deduction systems of these logics to
be given the axioms or rules should not be read as schemata unless otherwise specified.
On the other hand, it is shown in [5] and [20] that the consequence relations of these
logics are closed under flat substitutions, i.e., substitutions σ such that σ(p) is flat for
all propositional variables p.
4.1. InqL and PID
In this section, we define sound and (strongly) complete Hilbert style deduction
systems for propositional intuitionistic dependence logic (PID) and propositional in-
quisitive logic (InqL). All of the results for InqL were obtained already in [7], but we
include them in this section for the completeness of the paper and for the benefit of the
reader.
As the name suggested, propositional intuitionistic dependence logic PID satis-
fies all axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic (IPL). This is also true for its
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sublogic propositional inquisitive logic InqL (which has the same syntax as IPL). But
as pointed out already, not all the rules of IPL are sound in PID and InqL. Especially
the Substitution Rule is not sound in PID or InqL. Another property that distinguishes
PID and InqL from IPL is that the (atomic) double negation law ¬¬pi↔ pi, of which
only the direction pi →¬¬pi is valid in IPL, is valid in PID and InqL. But substitu-
tion instances ¬¬φ↔ φ of the atomic double negation law are not in general valid in
PID or InqL; a non-valid instance is given in (12). It is proven in [5] that a formula φ
in the language of InqL (or PID) is flat if and only if ¬¬φ→ φ is valid.
As proved in [7] and [5], there is a close connection between InqL and intermediate
logics, i.e., logics between intuitionistic propositional logic and classical propositional
logic. We briefly discussed in Section 1 that the team semantics induces an intuition-
istic Kripke frame. To be more precise, fix a finite set N of natural numbers. The set
P(2N)\ { /0} of all nonempty teams on N endowed with the superset relation ⊇ forms
a finite Kripke frame F = (P(2N) \ { /0},⊇). Define a valuation V on F such that a
propositional variable pi is true at a possible world X of F if and only if pi is true on
the team X . For formulas in the language of InqL (which is the language of IPL), the
usual single-world-based Kripke semantics corresponds exactly to the team semantics.
Moreover, the frame F is a so-called Medvedev frame, a frame for Medvedev logic ML
[26]. The schematic fragment of InqL, i.e., the subset of the set of theorems of InqL
that is closed under uniform substitution, is exactly ML. The logic InqL itself (the set
of theorems) is the negative variant of any intermediate logic L between Maksimova’s
logic ND [25] and ML, such as ML and Kreisel-Putnam logic KP [23]. Interested
readers are referred to [7] and [5] for details.
Below we present the sound and complete Hilbert style system of InqL as defined
in [7].
Definition 4.1 (A Hilbert style deduction system of InqL, [7]).
Axioms:
1. all substitution instances of IPL axioms
2. all substitution instances of the Maksimova’s axiom NDk for all k ∈ N:
(NDk)
(
¬pj →
∨
1≤i≤k
¬pi
)
→
∨
1≤i≤k
(¬pj →¬pi).
3. ¬¬pi→ pi for all propositional variables pi
Rules:
Modus Ponens: φ→ ψ ψ
ψ
(MP)
Note that the above system does not have the Substitution Rule and the axioms
are not axiom schemata. In particular, not every substitution instance of the axiom 3
(¬¬pi→ pi) is sound, whereas the Substitution Rule can be applied to axioms 1 and 2.
One can show in the system of InqL that every formula φ in the language of InqL
is provably equivalent to a formula
∨
f∈F Ψf in disjunctive-negative normal form (8).
This is a crucial fact used in the proof of the (Weak) Completeness Theorem for the
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above system given in [7]. The Strong Completeness Theorem is proved in [5] by the
standard canonical model argument. The reader is referred to the references for the
proof. Below we only state the theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem [5, 7]). For any set Γ∪
{φ} of formulas in the language of InqL, we have Γ ⊢InqL φ ⇐⇒ Γ |= φ.
Adding to the system in Definition 4.1 obvious axioms for dependence atoms that
correspond to the equivalences in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 we obtain a sound and (strongly)
complete deduction system of PID.
Definition 4.3 (A Hilbert style deduction system of PID). The system contains all
axioms and rules of the system for InqL given in Definition 4.1 together with the
following two axioms (not schemata):
Axioms:
4. =(pi)↔ (pi∨¬pi)
5. =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)↔
((
=(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pik )
)
→=(pj)
)
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem). Let Γ be a set of for-
mulas and φ a formula in the language of PID. Then Γ ⊢PID φ ⇐⇒ Γ |= φ.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.2, Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
4.2. PD∨
In this section, we define a natural deduction system of propositional dependence
logic with intuitionistic disjunction (PD∨) and prove the Soundness and Completeness
Theorem.
Let us first present our natural deduction system of PD∨. As emphasized already,
the consequence relation ⊢PD∨ given by this system is not structural. In the following
definition φ, ψ and χ are symbols in the metalanguage that stand for arbitrary formulas.
Axioms and rules presented using concrete formulas such as pi and dependence atoms
should, however, not be read as schemata.
Definition 4.5 (A natural deduction system of PD∨).
AXIOM
Atomic excluded middle
EM0pi⊗¬pi
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RULES
Conjunction introduction Conjunction elimination
φ ψ
φ∧ψ
∧I
φ∧ψ
φ
∧E
φ∧ψ
ψ
∧E
Intuitionistic disjunction introduction Intuitionistic disjunction elimination
φ
φ∨ψ ∨I
ψ
φ∨ψ ∨I
φ∨ψ
[φ]
.
.
.
χ
[ψ]
.
.
.
χ
∨Eχ
Tensor disjunction introduction Tensor disjunction weak elimination
φ
φ⊗ψ
⊗I φ
φ⊗ψ
⊗I
φ⊗ψ
[φ]
.
.
.
α
[ψ]
.
.
.
α
(∗) ⊗E−α
(∗) whenever α is a classical formula
Tensor disjunction substitution Commutative and associative laws for
tensor disjunction
φ⊗ψ
[ψ]
.
.
.
χ
⊗Sub
φ⊗χ
φ⊗ψ
ψ⊗φ
Com⊗
φ⊗ (ψ⊗χ)
Ass⊗
(φ⊗ψ)⊗χ
Contradiction introduction Contradiction elimination
pi∧¬pi
⊥
⊥I
φ⊗⊥
⊥E
φ
Distributive law
φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)
(φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ)
Dstr⊗∨
The above deduction system consists of one axiom and eleven sets of rules. The
only axiom, atomic excluded middle EM0, is not an axiom schema. Especially, as
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discussed already, the substitution instances of ¬pi are not necessarily well-formed
formulas in the language of PD∨.
The introduction and elimination rules for conjunction∧ and intuitionistic disjunc-
tion ∨ are the usual ones. Therefore the usual commutative law, associative law and
distributive laws, as listed in the next proposition (Proposition 4.6), can be easily de-
rived in the system. The tensor disjunction ⊗ behaves classically when applied to
classical formulas. So we have the usual introduction and elimination rules for ⊗ over
classical formulas, but the usual elimination rule is not sound for ⊗ in general; a coun-
terexample is given in (11). Since we only have the weak elimination rule ⊗E− for
⊗, the substitution, commutative and associative rules for ⊗ need to be added to the
deduction system. We also include a distributive law that involves⊗ in our system, and
in Proposition 4.6 we derive the other sound distributive laws. Note that not all usual
distributive laws that involve⊗ are sound. Among the following three distributive laws
(φ⊗ψ)∧ (φ⊗χ)/φ⊗ (ψ∧χ), (φ∧ψ)⊗ (φ∧χ)/φ∧ (ψ⊗χ)
and (φ∨ψ)⊗ (φ∨χ)/φ∨ (ψ⊗χ)
the first two are not sound in general if some of the formulas involved are non-classical
and the last one is not sound even for classical formulas. The following clauses are
counterexamples for the above three distributive laws with the team X = {s1,s2},
where s1(1) = 1 and s2(1) = 0, witnesses their failure:
(
(p1∨¬p1)⊗p1
)
∧
(
(p1∨¬p1)⊗¬p1
)
6|= (p1∨¬p1)⊗ (p1∧¬p1)
(
(p1∨¬p1)∧p1
)
⊗
(
(p1∨¬p1)∧¬p1
)
6|= (p1∨¬p1)∧ (p1⊗¬p1)
(p1∨¬p1)⊗ (p1∨¬p1) 6|= p1∨ (¬p1⊗¬p1)
Interesting derivable clauses of our deduction system are listed in the proposition
below.
Proposition 4.6. The following clauses are derivable:
(i) Ex falso: ⊥ ⊢ φ
(ii) Commutative and associative laws for conjunction and intuitionistic disjunction:
(a) φ∧ψ ⊢ ψ∧φ (b) φ∨ψ ⊢ ψ∨φ
(c) (φ∧ψ)∧χ ⊢ φ∧ (ψ∧χ) (d) (φ∨ψ)∨χ ⊢ φ∨ (ψ∨χ)
(iii) Distributive laws for intuitionistic disjunction and conjunction:
(a) φ∧ (ψ∨χ) ⊢ (φ∧ψ)∨ (φ∧χ) (b) (φ∧ψ)∨ (φ∧χ) ⊢ φ∧ (ψ∨χ)
(c) φ∨ (ψ∧χ) ⊢ (φ∨ψ)∧ (φ∨χ) (d) (φ∨ψ)∧ (φ∨χ) ⊢ φ∨ (ψ∧χ)
(iv) Distributive laws:
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(a) φ⊗ (ψ∧χ) ⊢ (φ⊗ψ)∧ (φ⊗χ) (Dstr⊗∧)
(b) φ∧ (ψ⊗χ) ⊢ (φ∧ψ)⊗ (φ∧χ) (Dstr∧⊗)
(c) φ∨ (ψ⊗χ) ⊢ (φ∨ψ)⊗ (φ∨χ) (Dstr∨⊗)
(d) (φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ) ⊢ φ⊗ (ψ∨χ) (Dstr⊗∨⊗)
(e) If α is a classical formula, then
- (α⊗ψ)∧ (α⊗χ) ⊢ α⊗ (ψ∧χ) (Dstr∗⊗∧⊗)
- (α∧ψ)⊗ (α∧χ) ⊢ α∧ (ψ⊗χ) (Dstr∗∧⊗∧)
Proof. The items (ii) and (iii) are derived as usual. It remains to derive the other items.
For the item (i), we have the following derivation:
⊥
⊗I
φ⊗⊥
⊥E
φ
For Dstr⊗∧, we have the following derivation:
φ⊗ (ψ∧χ)
[ψ∧χ]
∧E
ψ
⊗Sub
φ⊗ψ
φ⊗ (ψ∧χ)
[ψ∧χ]
∧Eχ
⊗Sub
φ⊗χ
∧I
(φ⊗ψ)∧ (φ⊗χ)
For Dstr∧⊗, we have the following derivation:
[ψ]
φ∧ (ψ⊗χ)
∧E
φ
∧I
φ∧ψ
φ∧ (ψ⊗χ)
∧E
ψ⊗χ
⊗Sub
(φ∧ψ)⊗χ (by a similar derivation)
(φ∧ψ)⊗ (φ∧χ)
For Dstr∨⊗, we have the following derivation:
φ∨ (ψ⊗χ)
[φ]
⊗I
φ⊗φ
∨I, ⊗Sub
(φ∨ψ)⊗ (φ∨χ)
[ψ⊗χ]
∨I, ⊗Sub
(φ∨ψ)⊗ (φ∨χ)
∨E
(φ∨ψ)⊗ (φ∨χ)
For Dstr⊗∨⊗, we have the following derivation:
(φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ)
[φ⊗ψ]
[ψ]
∨I
ψ∨χ
⊗Sub
φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)
[φ⊗χ]
[χ]
∨I
ψ∨χ
⊗Sub
φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)
∨E
φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)
For Dstr∗⊗∧⊗, if α is a classical formula, then we have the following derivation:
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(α⊗ψ)∧ (α⊗χ)
Dstr∧⊗(
(α⊗ψ)∧α
)
⊗
(
(α⊗ψ)∧χ
)
∧E, ⊗Sub
α⊗
(
(α⊗ψ)∧χ
)
Dstr∧⊗
α⊗ (α∧χ)⊗ (ψ∧χ)
∧E, ⊗Sub
α⊗α⊗ (ψ∧χ)
⊗E−, ⊗Sub
α⊗ (ψ∧χ)
For Dstr∗∧⊗∧, if α is a classical formula, then we have the following derivation:
(α∧ψ)⊗ (α∧χ)
∧E, ⊗Sub
α⊗α
⊗E−α
(α∧ψ)⊗ (α∧χ)
∧E, ⊗Sub
ψ⊗χ
∧I
α∧ (ψ⊗χ)
Next, we prove the Soundness Theorem for our deduction system.
Theorem 4.7 (Soundness Theorem). For any set Γ∪{φ} of formulas in the language
of PD∨, we have Γ ⊢ φ =⇒ Γ |= φ.
Proof. We show that Γ |= φ holds for each derivation D = 〈δ1, . . . , δk〉 with the con-
clusion φ and the hypotheses from Γ.
If D = 〈δ1〉, then φ ∈ Γ or φ = pi⊗¬pi. In the former case, obviously {φ} |= φ.
The latter case follows from the fact that |= pi⊗¬pi.
We only check the inductive step for the rules ⊗E− and Dstr⊗∨. The soundness
of the other rules can be verified as usual.
⊗E−: Assume that D0, D1 and D2 are derivations for Π0 ⊢ φ⊗α, Π1,φ ⊢ α and
Π2,ψ ⊢ α, respectively and α is a classical formula. We show that Π0,Π1,Π2 |= α
follows from the induction hypothesis Π0 |= φ⊗ψ, Π1,φ |=α and Π2,ψ |=α. Suppose
X |= θ for all θ ∈ Π0 ∪Π1 ∪Π2. Thus X |= φ⊗ψ, which means that there exist
Y,Z ⊆X such that X = Y ∪Z , Y |= φ and Z |= ψ. By the downward closure property
we have Y |= θ1 for all θ1 ∈Π1 and Z |= θ2 for all θ2 ∈Π2. It then follows that Y |= α
and Z |= α, which yield that X |= α, as α is classical (thus flat).
Dstr⊗∨: Assume that D is a derivation for Π ⊢ φ⊗ (ψ ∨χ). We will show that
Π |= (φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ) follows from the induction hypothesis Π |= φ⊗ (ψ∨χ). But
this is reduced to showing that φ⊗ (ψ ∨χ) |= (φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ). Now, for any team
X such that X |= φ⊗ (ψ∨χ), there are teams Y,Z ⊆X such that X = Y ∪Z , Y |= φ
and Z |= ψ ∨ χ. It follows that Y ∪Z |= φ⊗ ψ or Y ∪Z |= φ⊗ χ. Hence X |=
(φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ).
Clearly, classical propositional logic CPL is a fragment of PD∨. We now show that
our deduction system of PD∨ is conservative over the usual natural deduction system
of CPL.
Lemma 4.8. For any set Γ∪{φ} of classical formulas, Γ ⊢CPL φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢PD∨ φ.
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Proof. Restricted to classical formulas, our deduction system of PD∨ has the same
rules as the usual natural deduction system of CPL. Thus the direction “=⇒” follows.
For the converse direction “⇐=”, assuming Γ ⊢PD∨ φ, by the Soundness Theorem
we obtain that Γ |=PD∨ φ. Thus, for all valuations s, {s} |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ implies
{s} |= φ. But as all the formulas involved are classical formulas, by (5) from Section
1, for all valuations s, s |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ implies s |= φ in the sense of classical
propositional logic CPL. Now, by the Completeness Theorem of CPL we conclude
that Γ ⊢CPL φ.
We now proceed to prove the main result of this section, the Completeness Theo-
rem for our system. The proof goes through an argument via the normal form that is
common in proofs of the Completeness Theorems for logics. Already the first proofs of
the Completeness Theorem for classical propositional logic by Post [28] and Bernays
[3] used the disjunctive normal form. Also, Go¨del’s [14] proof of his Completeness
Theorem for classical first order logic was based on an application of a normal form.
In our case, the crucial step for the proof of the Completeness Theorem is to estab-
lish that every formula is provably equivalent in our deduction system to a formula in
disjunctive normal form (7) defined in Section 3. Let us now state this as a lemma.
Lemma 4.9. Every formula φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) in the language of PD∨ is provably equiv-
alent to a formula in disjunctive normal form
∨
f∈F
ΘXf , where ΘXf =
⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
), (13)
F is a nonempty finite set of indices and each Xf is a team on {i1, . . . , in}.
We will postpone the detailed proof of the above lemma and present the proof of
the Completeness Theorem for our system first.
Theorem 4.10 (Completeness Theorem). For any formulas φ and ψ in the language
of PD∨, we have ψ |= φ =⇒ ψ ⊢ φ. In particular, |= φ =⇒⊢ φ.
Proof. Suppose ψ |= φ, where φ= φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) and ψ = ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pin). By Theo-
rem 4.9 we have
ψ ⊣⊢
∨
f∈F
ΘXf and φ ⊣⊢
∨
g∈G
ΘYg . (14)
for some nonempty finite sets {Xf | f ∈ F} and {Yg | g ∈G} of teams on {i1, . . . , in}.
The Soundness Theorem implies that
∨
f∈F
ΘXf |=
∨
g∈G
ΘYg . (15)
If
∨
f∈F ΘXf = Θ /0 = ⊥, then we obtain ψ ⊢ ⊥ ⊢ φ by ex falso. If
∨
g∈GΘYg =
Θ /0 =⊥, in view of (15) we must have
∨
f∈F ΘXf = Θ /0 =⊥ as well. Hence ψ ⊢⊥ ⊢ φ
follows from (14).
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Now assume w.l.o.g. that
∨
f∈F ΘXf ,
∨
g∈GΘYg 6=⊥ and Xf ,Yg 6= /0 for all f ∈ F
and all g ∈ G. By Lemma 3.2, for each f ∈ F we have Xf ⊆ Ygf for some gf ∈ G.
Thus we have the following derivation:
(1) ΘXf
(2) ΘXf ⊗ΘXgf \Xf (⊗I)
(3) ΘYgf
(4)
∨
g∈GΘYg (∨I)
Thus ΘXf ⊢
∨
g∈GΘYg for each f ∈ F , which by the rule ∨E implies
∨
f∈F ΘXf ⊢∨
g∈GΘYg . Hence ψ ⊢ φ by (14).
Theorem 4.11 (Strong Completeness Theorem). For any set Γ∪{φ} of formulas in
the language of PD∨, we have Γ |= φ =⇒ Γ ⊢ φ.
Proof. By Theorem 4.10 and the Compactness Theorem (Theorem 3.3).
For logics that enjoy the Deduction Theorem, the clause φ |=ψ ⇐⇒ φ ⊢ ψ in The-
orem 4.10 is equivalent to the Weak Completeness Theorem (i.e., |= φ ⇐⇒ ⊢ φ) as
φ |= ψ is equivalent to |= φ→ ψ, and the Strong Completeness Theorem follows read-
ily from the Weak Completeness Theorem and the Compactness Theorem as Γ |= φ is
equivalent to |=
∧
∆ → φ for some finite subset ∆ of Γ. These usual arguments, how-
ever, do not apply to our logic PD∨, because PD∨ does not even have an implication
in its language (though the Deduction Theorem with respect to the intuitionistic impli-
cation does hold in its extension PT0). In particular, Theorem 4.10, which is crucial in
our proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem via compactness, is actually stronger
than the usual Weak Completeness Theorem for the logic. We leave the direct proof
of the Strong Completeness Theorem without applying the Compactness Theorem for
future work.
We end this section by supplying the proof of Lemma 4.9.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Note that in the statement of the lemma the fixed set {pi1 , . . . ,pin}
of variables occurring in the normal form of the formula φ may be different from the
set of variables occurring in the formula φ. In order to take care of this subtle point we
first prove the following claim:
Claim. If {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ N, then any formula ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pim) in the
normal form is provably equivalent to a formula θ(pj1 , . . . ,pjk ) in the normal form.
Proof of the claim. Without loss of generality, we may assume that K = {j1, . . . , jk}=
{i1, . . . , im, im+1, . . . , ik}. If k =m, then the claim holds trivially. Now assume k >m
and
ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pim) =
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
),
where F is a nonempty finite set of indices and each Xf is a team on M = {i1, . . . , im}.
Let
θ(pi1 , . . . ,pik ) =
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈2K
s↾M∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧ . . . . . . p
s(ik)
ik
).
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The following derivation proves ψ ⊢ θ:
(1)
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
)
(2) (pim+1 ⊗¬pim+1)∧·· ·∧ (pik ⊗¬pik) (EM0, ∧I)
(3)
∨
f∈F
(( ⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
)
)
∧ (pim+1 ⊗¬pim+1)∧·· ·∧ (pik ⊗¬pik)
)
((1),(2),∧I, distributive law)
(4)
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈2K
s↾M∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
∧p
s(im+1)
im+1
∧ . . . p
s(ik)
ik
) (Dstr∧⊗, ⊗I, ⊗Sub)
Conversely, θ ⊢ ψ is proved by the following derivation:
(1)
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈2K
s↾M∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
∧p
s(im+1)
im+1
∧ . . .p
s(ik)
ik
)
(2)
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈2K
s↾M∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
) (∧E,⊗Sub)
(3)
∨
f∈F
⊗
s∈Xf
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(im)
im
) (⊗E−)
⊣
Let N = {i1, . . . , in}. We now prove the lemma by induction on φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin).
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) = pik . Obviously pik ⊣⊢
⊗
s∈{1}
p
s(ik)
ik
, where the function
1 : {ik}→ {0,1}
is defined as 1(ik) = 1. Then, by the Claim, the formula pik is provably equivalent to
a formula θ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) in normal form.
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) = ¬pik . This case is proved analogously.
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) =⊥. Trivially ⊥ ⊣⊢Θ /0 =⊥.
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) = ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)∨χ(pi1 , . . . ,pin). By the induction hypothe-
sis we have
ψ ⊣⊢
∨
f∈F
ΘXf and χ ⊣⊢
∨
g∈G
ΘXg , (16)
where F,G 6= /0 and Xf ,Xg ⊆ 2N . Applying the rules ∨E and ∨I we obtain
ψ∨χ ⊣⊢
∨
f∈F
ΘXf ∨
∨
g∈G
ΘXg .
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If ψ ⊣⊢Θ /0 ⊣⊢⊥, then we obtain further ψ∨χ ⊣⊢
∨
g∈GΘXg by ex falso and the rules
∨E and ∨I. Similarly for the case when χ ⊣⊢Θ /0.
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) = ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)⊗χ(pi1 , . . . ,pin ). By the induction hypoth-
esis, we have (16). It suffices to show that ψ⊗χ ⊣⊢ θ, where
θ =
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
ΘXf∪Xg .
For ψ⊗χ ⊢ θ, we have the following derivation:
(1) ψ⊗χ
(2)
( ∨
f∈F
ΘXf
)
⊗
( ∨
g∈G
ΘXg
)
(3)
∨
f∈F
(
ΘXf ⊗
( ∨
g∈G
ΘXg
))
(Dstr⊗∨)
(4)
∨
f∈F
∨
g∈G
(
ΘXf ⊗ΘXg
)
(Dstr⊗∨)
(5)
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
ΘXf∪Xg (⊗E−, or ⊥E in case Xf = /0 or Xg = /0)
The other direction θ ⊢ ψ⊗χ is proved using the rules ⊗I and Dstr⊗∨⊗.
Case φ(pi1 , . . . ,pin) = ψ(pi1 , . . . ,pin)∧χ(pi1 , . . . ,pin). By the induction hypothe-
sis, we have (16), and
ΘXf =
⊗
s0∈Xf
(p
s0(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s0(in)
in
) and ΘXg =
⊗
s1∈Xg
(p
s1(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s1(in)
in
).
If ψ ⊣⊢Θ /0 or χ ⊣⊢Θ /0, then we obtain ψ∧χ ⊣⊢⊥ ⊣⊢Θ /0 by the rule ∧E and ex falso.
Now, assume that neither of ψ and χ is equivalent to ⊥. We show that ψ ∧χ ⊣⊢ θ,
where
θ =
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
ΘXf∩Xg and ΘXf∩Xg =
⊗
s∈Xf∩Xg
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
).
For ψ∧χ ⊢ θ, we have the following derivation:
(1) ψ∧χ
(2)
( ∨
f∈F
ΘXf
)
∧
( ∨
g∈G
ΘXg
)
(3)
∨
f∈F
∨
g∈G
(
ΘXf ∧ΘXg
)
(distributive law)
(4)
∨
f∈F
∨
g∈G
⊗
s0∈Xf
⊗
s1∈Xg
(
(p
s0(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s0(in)
in
)∧ (p
s1(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s1(in)
in
)
)
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(Dstr∧⊗, ⊗Sub)
(5)
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
⊗
(s0,s1)∈Xf×Xg
(
(p
s0(i1)
i1
∧p
s1(i1)
i1
)∧·· ·∧ (p
s0(in)
in
∧p
s1(in)
in
)
)
(Com ⊗, Ass ⊗)
(6)
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
(( ⊗
(s0,s1)∈Xf×Xg
s0=s1
(
(p
s0(i1)
i1
∧p
s1(i1)
i1
)∧·· ·∧ (p
s0(in)
in
∧p
s1(in)
in
)
))
⊗
( ⊗
(s0,s1)∈Xf×Xg
s0 6=s1
(
(p
s0(i1)
i1
∧p
s1(i1)
i1
)∧·· ·∧ (p
s0(in)
in
∧p
s1(in)
in
)
)))
(7)
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
⊗
(s,s)∈Xf×Xg
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
) (∧E,⊥E)
(8)
∨
(f,g)∈F×G
⊗
s∈Xf∩Xg
(p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(in)
in
) (⊗E−)
The other direction θ ⊢ ψ∧χ is proved using the rules ∨I, ⊗I and Dstr∗∧⊗∧.
4.3. PD
In this section, we develop a sound and complete natural deduction system of
propositional dependence logic (PD).
In the deduction system to be presented, we will need to specify a particular occur-
rence of a subformula inside a formula. For this purpose we identify a formula in the
language of PD with a finite string of symbols. A propositional variable pi is a symbol
and the other symbols are ∧,⊗,¬,=,(,). We number the symbols in a formula with
positive integers starting from the left, as in the following example:
= ( p1, p2 ) ⊗ ( ¬ p3 ∧ = ( p1, p2 ) )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
If themth symbol of a formulaφ starts a string ψ which is a subformula of φ, we denote
the subformula by [ψ,m]φ, or simply [ψ,m]. We will sometimes refer to an occurrence
of a formulaχ inside a subformulaψ of φ. In this case, we decide to be sloppy about the
notations and will use the same counting for the subformula ψ. We write φ(β/[α,m])
for the formula obtained from φ by replacing the occurrence of the subformula [α,m]
by β. For example, for the formula φ = =(p1,p2)⊗ (¬p3∧=(p1,p2)), we denote the
second occurrence of the dependence atom =(p1,p2) by [=(p1,p2),11], and the same
notation also designates the occurrence of =(p1,p2) inside the formula¬p3⊗=(p1,p2).
The notation φ[β/[=(p1,p2),11]] designates the formula =(p1,p2)⊗ (¬p3∧β).
Let us now present our natural deduction system of PD. As with the other logics
considered in this paper, the consequence relation ⊢PD of PD given by the system is
not structural. In the following definition, only the symbols φ and θ stand for arbitrary
formulas. The propositional variables pi in the axioms or rules cannot be substituted
by arbitrary formulas.
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Definition 4.12 (A natural deduction system of PD).
AXIOM
Atomic excluded middle
EM0pi⊗¬pi
RULES
The rules ∧I, ∧E, ⊗I, ⊗E−, ⊗Sub, Com⊗, Ass⊗, ⊥I and ⊥E from
Definition 4.5
Dependence atom introduction
pi
DepI0
=(pi)
¬pi
DepI0
=(pi)
[=(pi1)] . . . [=(pik )]
=(pj)
DepIk
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)
Dependence atom elimination
=(pi)
[pi]
.
.
.
θ
[¬pi]
.
.
.
θ
DepE0θ
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) =(pi1) . . . =(pik )
DepEk
=(pj)
Strong elimination
φ
[φ(pi/[=(pi),m])]
.
.
.
θ
[φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m])]
.
.
.
θ
SE
θ
All rules that do not involve the intuitionistic disjunction ∨ in the natural deduction
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system of PD∨ (Definition 4.5) are included in the above system of PD. Thus all
clauses in Proposition 4.6 that do not involve ∨ are derivable in the above system.
We have discussed in Section 2 that the behavior of dependence atoms can be char-
acterized completely using intuitionistic connectives:
=(pi)≡ pi∨¬pi and =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)≡
(
=(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pik )
)
→=(pj).
In view of the Deduction Theorem, these equivalences are equivalent to
=(pi) |= pi∨¬pi, pi |==(pi), ¬pi |= =(pi),
(
=(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pik)
)
→=(pj) |==(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)
and =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj),=(pi1), . . . ,=(pik ) |==(pj).
It is not hard to see that the induction and elimination rules for dependence atoms
characterize the above clauses. The Strong Elimination rule SE characterizes the inter-
action between constancy dependence atoms and other formulas, and the rule DepE0 is
a special case of the rule SE. For any formula φ, we have φ |= φ(pi∨¬pi/[=(pi),m]).
But as ∨ distributes over all connectives, this is reduced to φ |= φ(pi/[=(pi),m])∨
φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m]) (see the proof of the Soundness Theorem for details). If the in-
tuitionistic disjunction ∨ was a connective in our logic PD, then we could derive in
its sound and complete deduction system using the usual introduction and elimination
rules for ∨ that φ ⊢ φ(pi/[=(pi),m])∨φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m]). Then, we could derive θ
from φ as follows:
φ
φ(pi/[=(pi),m])∨φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m])
[φ(pi/[=(pi),m])]
.
.
.
θ
[φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m])]
.
.
.
θ
θ
Evidently every such derivation can be simulated in our deduction system using the
rule SE.
Before we prove the Soundness Theorem, as a demonstration of the system, let us
derive Armstrong’s Axioms [2] in the example below. To simplify notations, we use
x,y,z, . . . as metalanguage variables that stand for arbitrary propositional variables.
Example 4.13. The following clauses, known as Armstrong’s Axioms, are derivable
in the natural deduction system of PD.
(i) ⊢=(x,x)
(ii) =(x,y,z) ⊢=(y,x,z)
(iii) =(x,x,y) ⊢=(x,y)
(iv) =(y,z) ⊢=(x,y,z)
(v) =(x,y),=(y,z) ⊢=(x,z)
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Proof. The derivations are as follows. For (i):
[=(x)]
DepIk
=(x,x)
Note that in the above derivation the formula =(x) is both the assumption and the
conclusion of a sub-derivation.
For (ii):
=(x,y,z) [=(y)] [=(x)]
DepEk
=(z)
DepIk
=(y,x,z)
For (iii):
=(x,x,y) [=(x)] [=(x)]
DepEk
=(y)
DepIk
=(x,y)
For (iv):
=(y,z) [=(y)]
DepEk
=(z)
DepIk
=(x,y,z)
For (v):
=(y,z)
=(x,y) [=(x)]
DepEk
=(y)
DepEk
=(z)
DepIk
=(x,z)
Next, we prove the Soundness Theorem for the deduction system of PD.
Theorem 4.14 (Soundness Theorem). For any set Γ∪{φ} of formulas in the language
of PD, we have Γ ⊢ φ =⇒ Γ |= φ.
Proof. We show that Γ |=φ holds for each derivationD with conclusionφ and hypothe-
ses from Γ. We only verify the case when the strong elimination rule SE is applied.
The other cases are left to the reader.
Put φ∗1 = φ(pi/[=(pi),m]) and φ∗0 = φ(¬pi/[=(pi),m]). Assume that D0,D1 and
D2 are derivations for Π0 ⊢ φ, Π1,φ∗1 ⊢ θ and Π2,φ∗0 ⊢ θ, respectively. We show
that Π0,Π1,Π2 |= θ follows from the induction hypothesis Π0 |= φ, Π1,φ∗1 |= θ and
Π2,φ∗0 |= θ. This is reduced to showing that φ |= φ∗1 ∨φ∗0. We prove by induction on
subformulas ψ of φ that ψ |= ψ∗1 ∨ψ∗0 holds.
The case when ψ is an occurrence of an atom different from [=(pi),m] trivially
holds. Since =(pi) |= pi∨¬pi, the case ψ = [=(pi),m] also holds.
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If ψ = θ⊗χ and without loss of generality we assume that the occurrence of the
dependence atom [=(pi),m] is in the subformula θ, then by the induction hypothesis
we have θ |= θ∗1 ∨ θ∗0 . Thus θ⊗χ |= (θ∗1 ∨ θ∗0)⊗χ |= (θ∗1 ⊗χ)∨ (θ∗0⊗χ) |= θ∗1 ∨ θ∗0 .
The case ψ = θ∧χ is proved similarly.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of the Completeness Theorem
for our system. Our argument makes heavy use of the notion of the realization of a
formula. We will give the definition of realizations in two steps. Firstly we define
realizations for dependence atoms.
Let α = =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) be a dependence atom and K = {i1, . . . , ik}. We call a
function f : 2K → 2 a realizing function for α, where we stipulate that 2 /0 = { /0}. A
realization α∗f of the dependence atom α over f is defined as
α∗f :=
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧p
f(s)
j
)
.
By Lemma 2.1, α is semantically equivalent to the intuitionistic disjunction of all its
realizations, i.e., α≡
∨
f∈22K α
∗
f . The function f in a realization α∗f characterizes one
type of functional dependency between pj and pi1 , . . . ,pik , and thus the formula α∗f
“realizes” such dependency. Here the formula
∨
f∈22K α
∗
f is not in the language of
PD, as the intuitionistic disjunction ∨ is not an eligible connective in the logic PD.
Nevertheless, we will show that in the deduction system of PD one derives essentially,
in a sense that becomes apparent below, the equivalence between α and
∨
f∈22K α
∗
f .
We first prove the easy direction that α essentially follows from
∨
f∈22K α
∗
f . This, in
our deduction system of PD, is simulated by the derivation that α follows from each
intuitionistic disjunct α∗f .
Lemma 4.15. If f is a realizing function for a dependence atom α, then α∗f ⊢ α.
Proof. Suppose that f is a realizing function for α==(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj). We will show
α∗f ,=(pi1), . . . ,=(pik ) ⊢=(pj), (17)
from which α∗f ⊢ α will follow by applying the rule DepIk.
Claim. For all t : {1, . . . ,k}→ 2, we have α∗f ,p
t(1)
i1
, . . . ,p
t(k)
ik
⊢=(pj).
Proof of the claim. If ia = ib and t(a) = 1 6= 0 = t(b) for some a,b ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, then
α∗f ,p
t(1)
i1
, . . . ,p
t(k)
ik
⊢ pia ∧¬pib ⊢ ⊥ ⊢=(pj)
by the rule ⊥I and ex falso. Now, assume t(a) = t(b) for all a,b ∈ {1, . . . ,k} with
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ia = ib. The derivation is as follows:
(1) pt(1)i1 ∧·· ·∧p
t(k)
ik
(assumption, ∧I)
(2)
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧p
f(s)
j
)
(assumption)
(3)
⊗
s∈2K
(
(p
t(1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
t(k)
ik
)∧p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧p
f(s)
j
)
((1), (2), ∧I, Dstr∧⊗)
(4) (pt(1)i1 ∧·· ·∧p
t(k)
ik
∧p
f(st)
j )⊗
⊗
s∈2K\{st}
⊥,
where st(in) = t(n) for each n ∈ {1, . . . ,k} (⊥I, ∧E, ⊗Sub)
(5) pf(st)j (⊥E, ∧E)
(6) =(pj) (DepI0)
⊣
Next, we prove (17). By the Claim, for all s1 : {2, . . . ,k}→ 2 we have
α∗f ,pi1 ,p
s1(2)
i2
, . . . ,p
s1(k)
ik
⊢=(pj) and α∗f ,¬pi1 ,p
s1(2)
i2
, . . . ,p
s1(k)
ik
⊢=(pj).
Then, by the rule DepE0, we derive that for all s1 : {2, . . . ,k} → 2,
α∗f ,=(pi1),p
s1(2)
i2
, . . . ,p
s1(k)
ik
⊢ θ
Repeating this argument k times, we obtain (17). This completes the proof.
The converse direction that α essentially implies
∨
f∈22K α
∗
f will be a special case
of a general result (Lemma 4.18) in what follows. Now, we are ready to define realiza-
tions for arbitrary formulas φ. Let
o= 〈[α1,m1], . . . , [αc,mc]〉
be a sequence of some occurrences of dependence atoms in φ. A realizing sequence of
φ over o is a sequence Ω = 〈f1, . . . ,fc〉 such that each fi is a realizing function for αi.
We call the formula φ∗Ω defined as follows a realization of φ over o:
φ∗〈f1,...,fc〉 := φ((α1)
∗
f1/[α1,m1], . . . ,(αc)
∗
fc
/[αc,mc]).
Let O be the sequence of all of the occurrences of dependence atoms in φ. A realizing
sequence of φ over O is called a maximal realizing sequence, and a realization φ∗Ω
over O is called a complete realization of φ. Note that a complete realization φ∗Ω of
a formula φ in the language of PD is a classical formula. For example, consider the
formula φ==(p1,p2)⊗ (¬p3∧=(p1,p2)) that we discussed earlier. Let ǫ,δ : 2{1}→ 2
be two realizing functions for =(p1,p2). Over o= 〈[=(p1,p2),11]〉 the sequence 〈ǫ〉 is a
realizing sequence of φ and the formula=(p1,p2)⊗(¬p3∧(=(p1,p2))∗ǫ) is a realization
of φ. Both (=(p1,p2))∗δ⊗ (¬p3∧ (=(p1,p2))∗ǫ) and (=(p1,p2))∗ǫ⊗ (¬p3∧ (=(p1,p2))∗δ)
are complete realizations of φ. Note that if a formula does not contain dependence
atoms, then its maximal realizing sequence is the (unique) empty sequence 〈〉.
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Having defined the crucial notion for the proof of the Completeness Theorem, we
now check in the next lemma that every formula is semantically equivalent to the intu-
itionistic disjunction of its realizations over some o. In the proof of our main theorem
(Theorem 4.21), we are only interested in complete realizations, but the lemmas lead-
ing to this theorem will be stated in their most general forms.
Lemma 4.16. Let φ be a formula in the language of PD and Λ the set of all its realizing
sequences over a sequence o. Then φ≡
∨
Ω∈Λ
φ∗Ω.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on φ. The case that φ is a dependence atom
follows from Lemma 2.1. The case that φ is some other atom is trivial.
The induction case φ = ψ⊗χ follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact
that [A |= A′ and B |= B′ ] =⇒ A⊗B |= A′⊗B′ and that A⊗ (B∨C) |= (A⊗B)∨
(A⊗C). Similarly for the case φ= ψ∧χ.
A crucial fact to be used in the proof of the Completeness Theorem is that a formula
φ is essentially provably equivalent to
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω. We first prove the easy direction that
φ follows essentially from
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω. As with realizations for dependence atoms, we
will show, in the absence of the intuitionistic disjunction, that each realization of φ
implies φ.
Lemma 4.17. If Ω is a realizing sequence of a formula φ over a sequence of some
occurrences of dependence atoms in φ, then φ∗Ω ⊢ φ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on φ. The case that φ is a dependence atom
follows from Lemma 4.15. The case that φ is some other atom is trivial.
The induction case φ = ψ⊗χ is proved by applying the rule ⊗Sub and the case
φ= ψ∧χ is proved by applying the rule ∧Sub.
We now turn to the converse direction that φ essentially implies
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω. Let us
ponder on what we should settle here in the logic PD in the absence of the intuitionistic
disjunction. Assume that the intuitionistic disjunction was a connective in our logic
and we have proved that φ ⊢
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω. If we have a derivation of φ, then to derive
a formula θ from the same assumptions, it is sufficient to prove that θ follows from
each realization φ∗Ω of φ. Our idea is to discard the intermediate step that involves
the intuitionistic disjunction and conclude θ directly from φ as soon as the fact that θ
follows from each φ∗Ω is settled. To be precise, we will prove the lemma below.
Lemma 4.18. Let Λ be the set of all realizing sequences of φ over a sequence o of some
occurrences of dependence atoms in a formula φ. Let {ΠΩ | Ω ∈ Λ} be a collection of
sets of formulas. For any formula θ, if
∀Ω ∈ Λ(ΠΩ,φ∗Ω ⊢ θ), (18)
then
⋃
Ω∈Λ ΠΩ,φ ⊢ θ.
We will now work towards a proof of the above lemma. Clearly, if we consider
only a single occurrence of a constancy dependence atom in a formula, i.e., if o =
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〈[=(pi),m]〉, then the implication in the lemma follows immediately by applying the
rule SE. The idea is then to reduce the general case to this special case in a certain way.
First we show that dependence atoms with multiple arguments can be reduced to
formulas with constancy dependence atoms only. If α==(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj), we write
α∗ :=
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
∧=(pj)
)
,
where K = {i1, . . . , ik}. By Lemma 2.1, α and α∗ are semantically equivalent. Let
o = 〈[α1,m1], . . . , [αc,mc]〉 be a sequence of some occurrences of dependence atoms
in a formula φ and let
φ∗o := φ(α
∗
1/[α1,m1], . . . ,α
∗
c/[αc,mc]).
Lemma 4.19. Let φ and o be as above. Then φ ⊢ φ∗o.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on φ. If φ = =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) and K =
{i1, . . . , ik}, then we first derive
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) ⊢
⊗
s∈2K
(
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)∧p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
)
(19)
as follows:
(1) =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) (assumption)
(2) (pi1 ⊗¬pi1)∧·· ·∧ (pik ⊗¬pik) (EM0, ∧I)
(3)
⊗
s∈2K
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
)
(Dstr∧⊗)
(4)
⊗
s∈2K
(
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)∧p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
)
((1), (3), Dstr∧⊗)
Next, for each s : K→ 2, by the rules DepI0 and DepEk, we have
=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)∧p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(ik)
ik
⊢=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj)∧=(pi1)∧·· ·∧=(pik )
⊢=(pj)
Hence =(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj) ⊢ (=(pi1 , . . . ,pik ,pj))
∗
o follows from (19) and ⊗Sub.
If φ ∈ {pi,¬pi,⊥}, then the statement is trivial. The induction steps can be derived
using the rules ∧I and ⊗Sub.
In the next lemma we derive the special case of Lemma 4.18 in which the sequence
o consists of occurrences of constancy dependence atoms only. For a constancy depen-
dence atom =(pj) there are only two realizing functions, namely the constant functions
1 : { /0}→ 2 and 0 : { /0} → 2 defined as 1( /0) = 1 and 0( /0) = 0. And =(pj)∗1 = pj and
=(pj)
∗
0 =¬pj . A realizing sequence Ω = 〈f1, . . . ,fk〉 over a sequence o of occurrences
of constancy dependence atoms is a sequence of constant functions 1 and 0, and can,
therefore, be characterized by a function gΩ : {1, . . . ,k}→ 2 defined as gΩ(i) = fi( /0).
We identify the sequence Ω with the function gΩ and sometimes write φ∗gΩ instead of
φ∗Ω.
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Lemma 4.20. For each function g : {1, . . . ,k} → 2, Let Πg be a set of formulas. For
any formulas φ and θ, if Πg,φ∗g ⊢ θ holds for all g : {1, . . . ,k} → 2, i.e.,
Πg,φ(p
g(1)
j1
/[=(pj1),m1], . . . ,p
g(k)
jk
/[=(pjk),mk]) ⊢ θ,
then
⋃
g Πg,φ ⊢ θ.
Proof. By the assumption, for all h1 : {2, . . . ,k}→ 2 we have
Πg1,h1 ,φ(pj1 ,p
h1(2)
j2
/[=(pj2),m2], . . . ,p
h1(k)
jk
/[=(pjk),mk]) ⊢ θ
and
Πg0,h1 ,φ(¬pj1 ,p
h1(2)
j2
/[=(pj2),m2], . . . ,p
h1(k)
jk
/[=(pjk),mk]) ⊢ θ,
where g1,h1 : {1, . . . ,k} → 2 is the function h1∪{(1,1)} and g0,h1 : {1, . . . ,k} → 2 is
the function h1∪{(1,0)}. Then by the rule SE we derive for all h1 : {2, . . . ,k}→ 2,
Πg1,h1 ,Πg0,h1 ,φ(p
h1(2)
j2
/[=(pj2),m2], . . . ,p
h1(k)
jk
/[=(pjk),mk]) ⊢ θ.
Repeating this argument k times, we obtain
⋃
g Πg,φ ⊢ θ as required.
Having analyzed the simple realizations that involve constancy dependence atoms
only, let us now give the proof of Lemma 4.18. Our main argument is to apply
Lemma 4.19 to transform dependence atoms with multiple arguments to formulas with
constancy dependence atoms only so as to apply Lemma 4.20 to finish the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.18. Let o = 〈[α1,m1], . . . , [αc,mc]〉, αi = =(pi1 , . . . ,piki ,pji) and
Ki = {i1, . . . , iki} for any i ∈ {1, . . . , c}. In view of Lemma 4.19, to prove the lemma
it suffices to show that the assumption (18) implies ⋃Ω∈Λ ΠΩ,φ∗o ⊢ θ.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, let oi = 〈[=(pji), li,s]〉s∈2Ki be the sequence of all occur-
rences of the (constancy) dependence atoms in the subformula
α∗i =
⊗
s∈2Ki
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(iki )
iki
∧=(pji)
)
of φ∗o. Each function g :
⋃c
i=1{(i,s) | s ∈ 2Ki} → 2 induces a realizing sequence of
φ∗o over the sequence 〈o1, . . . ,oc〉 of occurrences of constancy dependence atoms. For
each i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, define a function fg,i : 2Ki → 2 as
fg,i(s) = g((i,s)).
Observe that fg,i is a realizing function for αi and Ωg = 〈fg,1, . . . ,fg,c〉 is a realizing
sequence of φ over o.
Claim. ΠΩg ,(φ∗o)∗g ⊢ θ.
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Proof of the claim. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, we have g ↾ {(i,s) | s ∈ 2Ki} induces a
realizing sequence of α∗i over oi and
(αi)
∗
fg,i
=
⊗
s∈2Ki
(
p
s(i1)
i1
∧·· ·∧p
s(iki )
iki
∧p
fg,i(s)
ji
)
= (α∗i )
∗
g.
Now, by (18) we have
ΠΩg ,φ((α1)
∗
fg,1/[α1,m1], . . . ,(αc)
∗
fg,c
/[αc,mc]) ⊢ θ,
which is
ΠΩg ,φ((α
∗
1)
∗
g/[α1,m1], . . . ,(α
∗
c)
∗
g/[αc,mc]) ⊢ θ, i.e., ΠΩg ,(φ
∗
o)
∗
g ⊢ θ.
⊣
Put
⋃c
i=1{(i,s) | s ∈ 2Ki} = A. By the Claim and Lemma 4.20, we obtain that⋃
g∈2A ΠΩg ,φ∗o ⊢ θ. It is not hard to see that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between functions g : A→ 2 and realizing sequences Ω of φ over o. This means that⋃
g∈2A ΠΩg =
⋃
Ω∈Λ ΠΩ, which completes the proof.
Now, we are in a position to prove the (Strong) Completeness Theorem for the
deduction system of PD.
Theorem 4.21 (Strong Completeness Theorem). For any set Γ∪{φ} of formulas in
the language of PD, we have Γ |= φ =⇒ Γ ⊢ φ.
Proof. By the Compactness Theorem (Theorem 3.3) we may assume that Γ is a finite
set and ψ =
∧
Γ. Suppose ψ |= φ. By Lemma 4.16 we have
ψ ≡
∨
Ω∈Λ
ψ∗Ω and φ≡
∨
∆∈Λ′
φ∗∆,
where Λ and Λ′ are the (nonempty) sets of all maximal realizing sequences of ψ and φ,
respectively.
For each Ω∈ Λ, we have ψ∗Ω |=
∨
∆∈Λ′ φ
∗
∆. Since Ω and ∆ are maximal realizing se-
quences, ψ∗Ω(pi1 , . . . ,pin) and φ∗∆(pi1 , . . . ,pin) are classical formulas. By the standard
argument these two classical formulas can be transformed into formulas in the classical
disjunctive normal form in the deduction system of CPL and therefore by Lemma 4.8
also in the deduction system of PD, i.e.,
ψ∗Ω ⊣⊢ΘXΩ and φ
∗
∆ ⊣⊢ΘY∆ , (20)
where XΩ, Y∆ are some teams on {i1, . . . , in}, and the formula ΘX(pi1 , . . . ,pin) is de-
fined as in Lemma 3.1. By the Soundness Theorem we obtain that ΘXΩ |=
∨
∆∈Λ′ ΘY∆ .
Now by the same argument as that in the proof of Theorem 4.11 one derives that
ΘXΩ ⊢ΘY∆0 for some ∆0 ∈ Λ
′
, which implies that ψ∗Ω ⊢ φ∗∆0 by (20). Hence we obtain
by Lemma 4.17 that ψ∗Ω ⊢ φ for all Ω ∈ Λ, which by Lemma 4.18 yields ψ ⊢ φ as
desired.
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5. Concluding remarks
We have shown that there is a robust expressively complete propositional depen-
dence logic for reasoning about dependencies on the propositional level. This logic
can be fairly called robust because it has five different expressively equivalent formu-
lations: PD, PD∨, PID, InqL and PT0, and each of these different formulations has
its complete axiomatization. This logic adopts the team semantics, which extends the
single-valuation semantics of classical propositional logic CPL in a conservative man-
ner: the team semantics reduces to the single-valuation semantics for formulas in the
language of CPL, and over singleton teams all connectives of the logic behave classi-
cally. Yet the move to teams allows us to meaningfully characterize the dependencies
between propositions, which cannot be expressed in CPL. Also, two non-classical
connectives (the intuitionistic disjunction and implication) are identified in the team
semantics setting. Exactly with these different connectives (and atoms) we formed our
different formulations of the logic.
These five formulations of the same logic are well-behaved also in the sense that all
of them have disjunctive or conjunctive normal forms that resemble the same normal
forms in CPL. Making essential use of the disjunctive normal form of the logics, [36]
proved the Craig’s Interpolation Theorem for all of the five logics, and [20] showed that
the logics are structurally complete with respect to flat substitutions (i.e., the admissible
rules of these logics with respect to flat substitutions are derivable).
The study of dependence in logic originates from the first-order context. When
quantifiers are added to our logics, many nice properties obtained in this paper fail
immediately. As already noted, first-order dependence logic is not axiomatizable, it is
much weaker in expressive power than first-order intuitionistic dependence logic, and
the equivalence given in Lemma 2.1 does not apply to first-order dependence atoms.
The results in this paper show that the dependence notion on the propositional level is
“simple”. This is justified by Theorem 1.7 and the simplicity of the sound and complete
deduction systems we defined in Section 4.
We finish by mentioning some relevant related areas. One area is the study of
the computational complexity of propositional logics of dependence. A downward
closed formula φ being satisfiable by some team is equivalent to φ being satisfiable
by some singleton team. Since over singleton teams dependence atoms are always
true and the logics have the same semantics as classical propositional logic CPL, the
satisfiability problem (SAT) for PT0 and its fragments has the same complexity as
SAT for CPL, which is well-known to be NP-complete. As for the model checking
problem (MC), [10] shows that MC for PD and PD∨ are NP-complete, and it follows
from [11] that MC for PID and InqL are coNP-complete. PD is closely related to
dependency quantified Boolean formulas, whose validity problem is shown in [27] to
be NEXPTIME-complete. On the basis of this, [32] showed that the computational
complexity of the validity problem of PD is NEXPTIME-complete.
Adding modalities to propositional dependence logic, one obtains modal depen-
dence logic, which was introduced in [31]. This field has been very active in recent
years. Another recent development is the rise of independence logic (introduced in
[15]), which is, a priori, stronger than dependence logic. The authors have a paper on
propositional independence logic under preparation.
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